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[Crim. No 11548. In Bank.

Nov. 27, 1968.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RALPH
CHACON, WILLIAM MICHAEL NOAH and MARINES H. MEYERS III, Defendants and Appellants.
[1&, 1b] Criminal Law-Appeal-Reversible Error-Counsel.-Jn
a prosecution of four defendants jointly charged with malicious assault with a deadly weapon by a life prisoner, the
refusal of the trial judge to provide separate counsel for each
of three defendants deprived them of the right to the effective
assistance of counsel requiring reversal of judgments as to
both guilt and penalty, where at no time did the court indicate

[1] Duty of court when appointing counsel for defendant to
llame attorney other than one employed by, or appointed for, a
eociefendant, note, 148 A.L.R. 183. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal
Law, § 156; Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 319.
!ticK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 1359; [2] Criminal
Law, §107(15)j [3] Criminal Law, §107(11); [4] Criminal Law,
§ nO(8); [5] Criminal Law, § 107(15); [6] Criminal Law,
§ 107(22); [7] Criminal Law, § 1382.2(1); [8] Criminal Law,
§ 391(1); [9, 10] Criminal Law, § 264(4); [11] Witnesses,
,275(1); [12] Witnesses, § 270; [13] Witnesses, §§ 273, 275(1);
[14] Witnesses, § 273; [15-17] Assault and Battery, § 46.
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to these defendants that separate counsel might he appointed
for each of them, where their only choice was to acct'pt one
I
/'
attorney for all or proceed without an attorney, and where,
although a common defense was 'presented by counsel representing all three defendants and the record was silent as to
evidence that might have been developed on behalf of each if
separately represented, the facts of the case were fraught
with potentially effective individual defenses which could not }'
be presented by counsel common to all three.
Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Codefendants.-The _:
right to counsel at trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Cal. Const., art. I, § 13,
does not include an automatic right to separate counsel for
each codefendant, and one counsel may represent more than
one defendant so long as the representation is effective.
Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Adequacy of Defense.-Elfective assistance of counsel is assistance untrammeled imd unimpaired by a eourt order requiring that one
lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests; and
if counsel must represent conflicting interests or is ineffective
because of the burden of representing more than one defendant, the injured defendant has been denied his constitutional
right to effective counsel.
[4] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Implied Waiver
From Conduct or Lack of Request.-In a prosecution of four
defendants jointly charged with malicious assault with a
deadly weapon by a life prisoner, if defendants were denied
the right to effective representation of counsel, the appellate
court cannot imply or presume that the right was waived by
their silence or by their failure to request separate counsel
where the court did not advise them of their right to separate
counsel if a conflict was prescnt. (Disapproving People v.
Winklespecht, 237 Clll.App.2d 227 [46 Cal.Rptr. 697.], People
v. Byrd, 228 Cal.App.2d 646 [39 Cal.Rptr. 644], and People v.
Sprinkle, 201 Cal.App.2d 277 (19 Cal.Rptr. 804], insofar as they
are to thc contrary.)
{5] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Codefendants; Conflict of Interest.-In a criminal prosecution of multiple
defend:mts, conflicts of intl'rest necessarily exist when the
jury must fix the penalty for more than one defendant, and
the conflict is not limited to the trial on the issue of penalty,
for normally the Rallle jury deterlllines both the issue of guilt.
and the issue of penalty.
[6] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Review.-The right
to have the ll.ssistllnee of counsel in a crilllinal prosecution is
too fundamental anel ahsolute to allow courts to indulge in
nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its

denial
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[7a,

7b] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Evidence of Other
Offenses.-In a prosecution of four defendants jointly charged
with malicious assault with a deadly weapOn by a life prisoner,
the prejudicial effect of admissible cumulative testimony of a
prison records officer that each of the four defendants was
serving a life term at the time of the alleged offense, listing all
the convictions for which each was serving time, a total of
nine violent or dangerous felonies for all of them, outweighed
the legitimate purpOses served by its admission where, at the
outset of the trial the jury was presented with the picture of
four hardened, vicious convicts charged with another offense
in a long line of similar violent offenses, where both defense
counsel were willing to stipulate that the four defendants were
serving life terms, and where the prosecuting attorney would
agree to such stipulation only if commitment records were
admitted for his use in argument, thus indicating full awareness of the prejudicial effect of the testimony and a wish to
make full advantage of it.
[8] Id.-Evidence - Competency and Materiality - Evidence of
Former Offense Showing Guilt in Present Action.-When a
prior conviction is an essential element of an offense, it is
admitted to prove something other than the defendant's bad
character, and is admissible for that purpose.
[9] Id.-Trial-Custody and Control of Defendant.-In a prosecution of four defendants jointly charged with malicious assault
with a deadly weapon by a life pri,soner, the jury was not
prejudiced by the appearance of each defendant throughout
the trial handcuffed and in prison garb where it appeared thut
the restraints were reasonable, that all defendants were similarly treated for at least some parts of the trial, that no I('g
chains were used and there was no evidence of excessive use of
guards in the courtroom, that there was no objection to the
handcuffs or clothing by defendants, that during the 'Voi,. di,.e
the trial judge, prosecuting attorney, and defense attorneys
inquired whether the jury would be affected by the handcuffs
in making their decision to which all respOnses were negativ(',
and that the prosecutor in argument to the jury emphasized
that they should not be prejudiced because defendants were in
handcuffs, defense counsel similarly admonished the jury, and
did not request a similar admonition by the court.
[10] Id.-Trial-Custody and Control of Defendant.-A defendant may be required to undergo reasonable restraints when
they are necessary to assure his detention or to maintain order
in the courtroom.
[11] Witnesses-Impeaching One's Own Witness-Inconsistent

\
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[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 137 i Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 321
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Statements.-In a prosecution of four defendants jointly
charged with malicious assault with a deadly weapon by a life
prisoner, the testimollY of the ('ollviet assault victim, a necessary witness iu the prosecution's case, aud of two correctional
counsellors at state prisons, was admissible, where the victim
testified for tile prosecution, stated he had started the fight,
had spoken with a correctional officer but had not implicated
defendants, had not said he would refuse to testify for the
state out of fear. and did not presently fear the defendants;
where his testimony was evasive and uncooperative; where one
correctional counsellor then testified to a conversation with
the victim in which the latter said nothing about starting the
fight, said all four defendants had stabbed him, and said he
would not testify for the stnte because he did not wish to be
considered an informer; and where the other correctional officer then testified regarding the "convicts' code," described as
an unwritten rule that prison inmates be silent about. prison
disciplinary matters.
\1
[12] Id.-Impeaching One's Own Witness.-One of the purpose~
of Evid. Code, § 785, relating to attacking the credibility of a
witness, is to allow a party to use and impeach a hostile!
witness that he had called.
[18] Id.-Impeaching One's Own Witness-Showing of Hostility:
Inconsistent Statements.-In a prosecution of four defendants
jointly charged with malicious assault with a deadly weapon
by a life prisoner, prosecution impeachment of the convict
assault victim called as a witness by it by the use of a prior
ineonsistent statement was proper where a correctional coun-:
seller at a state prison testified that in his previous statements
the victim had described the event differently and indicated,
fear of defendants; and the correctional officer's testimony as
to the victim's fear of defendants was also admissible to show
bias of the witness in favor of defendants.
[14] Id.-Impeaching One's Own Witness-Showing of Hostility.
-In a prosecution of four defendants jointly charged with
malicious assault with a deadly weapon by a life prisoner, tes-!
timony of the correctional officer at the prison as to conditions i
generally existing in prisons and their effect on the veracity of !
prisoners was relevant and admissible to show circumstances 1
affecting the bias of the convict. assault victim, called as a 1
prosecution witness in favor of defendants, where the witness
did not give his opinion on the guilt or innocence of defend- I
ants, and testified, not that the assault victim was lying, but
that the conditions under which he lived might compel him to
lie.
[15] Assault-Assault by Life Convict-Instructions.-In a prose(lution of four defendants jointly charged with malicious
'I'

[15] See Cal.Jur.2d, Prisons and Prisoners, § 102 et seq.
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assault with a deadly weapon by a life prisoner, the instruc·
tions on malice aforethought were inadequate where the trial
judge instructed that an essential element of the otrens!' st:ltl'II
in Pen. Code, § 4500, proscribing assaults by a life prisoner,
was that the assault be committed with malice aforethought,
that the term denoted purpose and design in contradistinction
to accident and mischance, and was used to denote the purpose
and design of the assaulting party, and that in order to estab·
lish guilt it was not required that the assault be made with
intent to kill, rather than following the definition developed
under Pen. Code, §§ 187 and 188, in instructing on malice
aforethought.
[16] ld.-Assault by Life CODvict-IDstructioDs.-Pen. Code,
§ 4500, proscrihing assaults by a life prisoner, expressly requires that an assault punishable therein must be "with malice
aforethought"; the words malice aforethought in § 4500 have
the same meaning as in Pen. Code, §§ 187, 188, relating to murder and malice, and the rules regarding malice aforethought as
an element in a charge of murder apply to § 4500.
[17] ld.-Assault by Life CODvict-InstructioDs.-In a prosecution of four defendants jointly charged with malicious assault
with a deadly weapon by a life prisoner, the trial court's
refusal to give defendants' requested instruction on the issue
of provocation, although he did instruct on the issue of self·
defense, was erroneous, where, by refusing the instruction, he
foreclosed the possibility that even though the defense of selfdefense failed, as it might have for excessive retaliation by
defendants, the jury might still have found the original attack
by the convict victim sufficient to constitute provocation which
would have precluded a finding of malice aforethought, an
essential element of the offense.

APPEALS, two automatically taken under Pen. Code,
§ 1239, subd. (b), from judgments of the Superior Court of
Monterey County. Gordon Campbell, Judge. Reversed.
Prosecutions for malicious assault with a deadly weapon by
life prisoners. Judgments of conviction imposing death penalty
as to two defendants and life imprisonment as to tllird defendant reversed.
LeRue James Grim, Ralph R. Lopez and Ollie M. MarieVictoire, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for
Defendants and Appellants.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, and Michael J. Phelan, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
88 C.2d-25
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-Ralph Chacon, William Noah, Marines
Ml'yers, and Ernest Garcia wpre jointly charged with violating Penal Code section 4500 (malicious assault with a deadly
weapon by a life prisonrr). Chacon, Noah, and Meyers
pleaded not guilty and 110t guilty by reason of insanity. Gar-,
cia pleaded not guilty. A jury returned verdicts of guilty
against Chacon, Noah, and Meyers, but was unable to reach a
verdict as to Garcia, and the trial court declared a mistrial as
to him. After a trial on the issue of sanity, the jury found
that Chacon, Noah, und Meyers were sane at the time of the
offense. After a trial on the issue of penalty, the jury fixed the
punishment for Chacon and Noall at death and for Meyers at
life impri:>onment. The trial court denied Chacon's and
Noah '8 motions to reduce the prnulty to life imprisonment
and entered judgments on tIle verdicts. The appeals of Chacon
and Noah ~re automatic (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b». The
appeal of Meyers is pursuant to a timely notice of appeal.
On April 30, 1967, approximately 14 prisoners were housed
in separate cells in the maximum security section of the Correctional Training Facility at Soledad. The maximum security
section consists of single cells fl·onted by a passageway or tier.
Guards are stationed at one end of the tier, and on the day of
the incident Officcrs Nance and Fagen were on duty there.
At 10 a.m. five prisoners, Chacon, Noah, Meyers, Roger
Smith, and Vernon Byrd, were released from their cells to
exercise on the tier. Chacon, Noah, and Meyers wore skull
caps with swastikas painted on them. At approximately 10 :15
the attention of both guards was drawn to a disturbance on
the tier. The two officers observed a scuffle between Smith,
Chacon, Noah, and Meyers approximately 65 feet in front of
them. Warning systems were sounded and Officer Fagen
shouted to the inmates to "lock-up" (reenter their cells).
Only Byrd complied with this order. Officer Knox, who was
guarding the isolation cells nearby, joined Officers Nance and
Fagen. The three offirers saw Noah, Chacon, and Meyers
crowded around Smith who was being held on the floor. Each
of the three defendants had a knife. Each repeatedly stabbed
Smith while the others held l.im. Noah and Chacon then
dragged Smith approximately 40 feet and propped him in
front of Garcia's cell. Chacon gave Garcia a knife, and Garcia
reached out through a food slot in the cell door and stabbed
Rmith. Noah, Chacon, and Meyers then went to Noah's cell
and locked themselves in. Officer Nance approached Noah's cell
where he saw tIle three defendants laughing. When, asked if
his "buddy" had kliifed Ilim, Noal) answered "That's what
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llappened, Sarge." When the officers approached Garcia's
cell and asked where the knife was, Garcia replied that he had
thrown it away.
The officers found three knives on tIle tier: two icepiek typc
weapons and one dagger. One icepick had been fashioned from
part of a hair brush; the rest of the brush was in Noah's cell.
The swastika caps were also in Noah's cell. One officer testified that he saw Meyers throw a knife away before he entered
Noah's cell.
Three physicians operated on Smith for five hours. He had
multiple puncture wounds throughout his body and was in a
critical condition for severa I days.
The records officer at Soledad testified that each of the four
defendants was serving a life term, and that none of their
indeterminate sentences had bren set by the Adult A nthority.
Eight inmates testified for the defense: Noah, Meyers, Garcia, four other inmates present at the time, and the victim,
Smith, who was called as a prosecution witness but gave testimony favorable to the defense. Except for minor descrepancies
in detail, all gave similar testimony.
The crucial defense was that none of the officers had sr('11
the fight begin and that Smith had started it. Smith and
defendants had been together at various prisons, w11ere animosity had developed between them. Before being placed ill
maximum security Smith had been in isolation near defendants' cells and while there had constantly shouted threats and
profanities at them. He had also had trouble with the prison
guards. On the day of the offense Smith made a homosexual
advance to Meyers. Noah told Smith to stop it. Smith tl](,11
drew a knife and attacked Noah. Meyers came to Noah's
defense, and Smith stabbed him also. In self defense, both
Meyers and Noah drew their own knives and began stabbing
Smith in return. Chacon then intervened in an attempt to
break up the fight. He first struck Smith with his fist, stunning him and causing him to drop his knife. Cllaeon t)]('Il
picked up the knife to keep it from Smith, while continuing to
attempt to break up the fight. Chacon did not stab Smith.
Chacon and Noah then dragged Smith in thc direction of
Garcia's cell, but Garcia did not stab Smith.
Two psychiatrists testified for the prosecution at the trial
on the issue of sanity. Dr. Raymond Hack, cOllsultant at 80]('dad for the past 12 years, testified that he llad examined
Chacon, Noah, and Meyers and that on the basis of his examinations and a review of their records it was his opinion tllat
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each was sanc at the time of the assault. Dr. Robert Noce, a
psychiatrist employed by the Monterey County Hospital, testified that on the basis of his examination of the three defendants, it was his opinion that each had a sociopathic personality, but was sane at the time of the offense.
Three inmaies in addition to Meyers and Noah testified for
the defense. Inmates Garrett and Branch testified that they
had seen Noah often act so erratically that each considered
Mm insane. Inmate Solis testified for defendant Chacon that
he too often acted erratically and often went into "twilight
zones" in which he became extremely noncommunicative.
Noah and Meyers testified that they had never described the
incident to the psychiatrists.
At the trial on the issue of penalty the prosecution submitted its case on the evidence at the trial on the issue of
guilt and tl1e trial on the issuc of sanity. Chacon, Noah, and
Meyers each testified in his own behalf.
At the outset we note tllat with respect to Chacon and
Noah, there was error such as that condemned in Witherspoon
v. IUillois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 521-523 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784786,888.Ct.1770].
Five of the nine jurors were excused for cause on the
ground of t1wir opposition to the death penalty before they
had made it "unmistakably clear" that they would "automatically" refuse to vote for the death penalty. (Witherspoon v. Illinois, st/p"a, 391 U.S. 510, 522 fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d
776, 785].) One juror was excused when she answered, "I
think I would," when asked whether she "would . . . have
any objection to rendering a death verdict" if the facts and
law warranted it. Three jurors were dismissed when they
answered that they "would not be able to sign the [death]
verdict as foreman." 'fhat answer indicated that they would
not undertake what they regarded as the greater moral burden of the jury foreman, but it did not show that they would
have refused to vote for the death penalty.1 Finally, a fifth
juror was excused who answ(,red, "I don 't think so" when
lOne of tlwse tllI'ee jUl'ors was excused although he was even more
indecisi\'e when IIsked whether he would sign his name to the verdict as
foreman. When asked if he had ohjections to the imposition of the death
penalty he stnted that he dit!. \\11C1I asked if he would nevertheless return
II verdict of denth if the facts called 1'01' it, he replied that he was not
opposed to the death penalty RK slleh but jll~t to the way it was admini~
tercIl, und then he ('Ial'ifiell his "llIh'ment with nil explanution thl1t be
wus 1I0t (,ppo~ed to th,' Jputh ,,,·nalty if 11,1' fnctH call,·a for it. '1'111.' jlll'or
was Ihen askl'd ",h,·tlu',' I,,· "oul<l sigll hili ,"""1' 8S fOfl'IIIUIl to u <leat.h
penalty verdict and he answered "I aw afraid not." He was then
excused.
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asked if he could impose the death penalty. lIe was not
allowed to give an unambiguous yes or no answer to the question. This error would require at the least a new trial for
Chacon and Noah on the issue of penalty.
[la] We have concluded, however, that all three judgments must be reversed as to both guilt and penalty on the
ground that the refusal of the trial judge to provide separate
counsel for each defendant deprived them of the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.
The four defendants appeared at their arraignment with
out counsel. The court appointed Mr. Ralph Lopez to represent all of thcm. Mr. Lopez had been admitted to practice for
only about six months before the trial. He represents Meyers
on this appeal. Other counsel were appointed to represent
Chacon and Noah on appeal. After a brief consultation with
Mr. Lopez, Chacon, Noah, and Meyers pleaded not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity; Garcia pleaded not guilty.
At their next appearance, Mr. Lopez informed the court that
Chacon and Noah wished to represent themselves, that Garcia,
who was not present, wished separate counsel, and that only
Meyers still wished Mr. Lopez to represent him.2
After briefly questioning Chacon and Noah, the court dismissed Mr. Lopez as their counsel but appointed him to act as
their advisor during the trial. On the day set for trial, Mr.
Lopez informed the court that Chacon and Noah had changed
their minds, that they wanted him to represent them as well
as Meyers, and that he was willing to do so because he was
already familiar with the case. With the consent of Chacon
and Noah, the court reappointed Mr. Lopez, and the trial
proceeded. At no time did the court indicate to either Chacon,
Noah, or M~yers that separate counsel might be appointed for
each of them. The only choice they had was to accept Mr.
Lopez or proceed without an attorney.
[2] The right to counsel at trial guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Gideon v.
Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [9 L.Ed.2d 799, 83 8.Ct. 792,
2The discussion between Mr. Lopez and the court indicates that Mr.
Lopez was aware that other counsel could be appointed if he felt that
there was a conflict of interest between any of the defendants. "Mr.
Lopez: (Interrupting) Well, Your Honor, before proceeding I'd like to
inform the court that the defendant Garcia wishes to have another attorney appointed to defend him. He'S the one that is not present today.
I might say that there's some conflict of interest between his case and
the other three defendants that are present today, but be has informed
me by Jetter he doesn't want me anymore, that he wants the court to
appoint another attorney for him."
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93 A.J~.R.2d 733]) and article I, scction 13 of the California
Constitution does not indude un automatic right 1.0 xl'parate
counsel for cadi codt>fl'ndant. Out> counsel may repl'f'x(,llt more
than olle defendant so long as the represcntation is effective.
(Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 71 [77 L.Ed. 158, 171172, 53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527].) [3] Effective assistance
of counsel is assistance ,. untrammeled and unimpaired by a
court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously
reprt>sent conflicting interests." (Glasser v. United States
(1942) 315 U.S. 60, 70 [86 hEd. 680, 699, 62 8.Ct. 457];
l'fople v. Dougla.~ (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 437 [38 Cal.Rptr.
884, 392 P.2d 964].) If counsel must represent conflicting
interests or is ineffective because of the burdens of representing more than one def(:'Ildant, the injured defendant has been
denied his constitutional right to effective counsel. (United
States v. Gla,sser, supra; People v. Robinson (1954) 42 Cal.2d
741, 745-748 [269 P.2d 6] ; People v. Lanigan (1943) 22 Cal.
2d 569, 576-577 [140 P.2d 24, 148 A.L.R. 176]; People v.
Douglas, supra; People v. Donphoe (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 17,
24 [19 Cal.Rptr. 454].)
i
[4] If defendants were denied the right to effective representation of counsel, we cannot presume that the right was
waived by a failure to request separate counsel. The court did
not advise them of their right to separate counsel if a conflict
was present, and we cannot imply from their silence a waiver
of that right. (Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 515
f8 I~.Ed.2d 70, 76-77, 82 8.Ct. 884] ; In re Johnson (1965) 62
Ca1.2d 325, 333 [42 Cal.Rptr. 228, 398 P.2d 420] ; Lollar v.
United States (D.C. Cir. 1967) 376 F.2d 243, 245; Ford v.
United States (D.C. Cir. 1967) 379 F.2d 123, 125.) Insofar 8S
People v. Winklespecht (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 227, 230 [46
Cal.Rptr. 697]; People v. BY"d (1964) 228 CaI.App.2d 646,
649-650 [39 Cal.Rptr. 644]; and People v. Sprinkle (1962)
201 Ca1.App;2d 277, 282 [19 Cal.Rptr. 804], are to the contrary. they are disapproved. These cases have not been followed on this point in recent cases discussing the right to
separate counsel. (See People v. George (1968) 259 Cal.App.
2d 424-432 [66 Cal.Rptr. 442] [no conflict found]; People
v. Watkins (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 603, 606 [56 Cal.Rptr.
734] [no conflict found] ; and People v. Keesee (1967) 250
Cal.App.2d 794,798 [58 Cal.Rptr. 780] [conflict found, judgment reversed, hearing denied] .) In addition, they all
refrained from basing affirmance solely on the procedural
ground that the defendant had not objected to multiple representation in the trial court.

)
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[5] Conflicts of intcrcst necessarily exist when the jury
must fix. the penalty for more than one defendant. Oftt'll the
strongest argument that separate counsel can make 011 the
issue of penalty is that his client was less culpable than the
others and that he, at least, should not be executed. In addition, he must be free to stress particular mitigating elemellts
in hi~ client's background or other individual mitigating factors that may not apply to a codefendant. Counsel representing more than one defendant is necessarily inhibited in making such arguments and in presenting evidence to support
them. He cannot simultaneously arguc with any semblance of
effectiveness that each defendant is most deserving of the
lesser penalty. Moreover, the conflict is not limited to the trial
on the issue of penalty, for normally the same jury determilles
both the issue of guilt and the issue of penalty. Counsel must
therefore conduct the defense throughout the entire trial to
stress evidence and considerations to support the lesser penalty. Counsel appointed to represent more than one defendant
when the jury must fix the penalty for each is forced, as Mr.
Lopez was forced in this case, to treat his client!\ as a group
and to abandon arguments that would apply to each separately.
[lb] Since a common defense was presented by counsel
representing aU three defendants, the record is silent as to
evidence that might have been developed on behalf of each
defendant had he been separately represented. Nevertheless,
the facts of the case are fraught with potentially effective
individual defenses. On the basis of the defense testimony,
defendant Noah had the strongest case for self-defense in that
he was the one Smith first attacked. Defendant Meyers
entered the fray to defend his "brother" Noah, and then was
attacked himself. Defendant Chacon did not attack the victim
at all. Mr. I.JOpez made no attempt to develop these differences.
In his cross-examination of the guards, he made no effort to
develop weaknesses or inconsistencies in their testimony with
respect to any of the defendants separately. He made JlO
attempt to determine whether the guards might have erred in
their description of the incident so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to one or another of the defendants' guilt.
Separate counsel for Chacon could have argued to the jury
t118t, regardless of who started the fight, all defense witnesses
exonerated Chacon and that the guards could llave been mistaken in believing that aU three took turns in atttaeking
Smith.

J
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Separate counsel for Noah could have argued that he struck
only in self-defense and that what the guards observed thereafter was Chacon and Meyers taking advantage of the turmoil
to vent their rage on Smith. Separate counsel for Meyers
could have made similar contentions.
Mr. Lopez could not make these arguments in favor of each
defendant to dissociate him from his codefendants' cases, for
he represented them all and had to make common cause for
them. This unified posture of the defense is revealed most
clearly by an examination of the closing argument at the trial
on the issue of guilt. The summation so merged the three
defendants that at one point, the judge himself felt compelled
to interrupt and point out that the jury could return a different verdict for each defendant. As the court said in People v.
Donohoe (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 17, 28 [19 Cal.Rptr. 454] :
"\Ve think that it is a fair assumption that the argument of
defense counsel must of necessity have been restricted in its
scope and in places restrained in its tone by an ever present
concern that his comments on behalf of one defendant did not
injure or offend the other. "
The extent of the conflict of interest in this case is demonstrated by the fate of the fourth defendant, Garcia. Hi$
defense was as consistent with the others' defense as theirs
was among themselves: all the prosecution witnesses implicated Garcia, whereas all the defense witnesses exonerated
him. His defense was identical with that of Chacon, in that
neither attacked Smith. Garcia, however, was represented by
separate counsel who developed weaknesses in the evidence as
it pertained to Garcia. He stressed the distance the guards
were from Garcia's cell, the amount of lighting in the tier,
the difficulty in depth perception when looking at a long line
of cells. The result was that Garcia alone secured a hung
jury.
The extent of the conflict of interest and its impact on Mr.
Lopez's effectiveness, was certainly not so slight that we can
ignore it. 3 [6] As the Supreme Court said in Glasser, 315
U.S. 60, S1tpra, at page 76 [86 hEd. 680 at p. 702], "The
aSeveral United States Courts of Appeals have adopted much the Bame
position that we take here. In Lollar v. United States, supra, 376 F.2d
243,247, the court stated: "[O)nly where' "we can find no basis in the
record for an informed speculation" that appellant's rights were prejudicially affected,' can the conviction stand. . . . In effect, we adopt the
IItandard of 'reasonable doubt,' II standard the Supreme Court recently
said must govern whenever the prosecution coutends the denial ot a con·
Rtitlltional right is merely harmless error." See also Campbell v. United
States (D.C. Cir. 1965) 352 F.2d 359, 360-361 [122 App.D.C. 143];
Sawyer v. Brough (4th Cir. 1966) 358 F.2d 70, 73·74.
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right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to
the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. "
We turn now to other issues that may arise on retrial.
[7a] Defendants Noah and Chacon contend that the
prosecutor committed misconduct in emphasizing their prior
felony convictions at the outset of the trial. The records
officer at Soledad was the first witness for the prosecution. He
testified that each of the four defendants was serving a life
term at the time of the incident and listed all the convictions
for which each was serving time, a total of nine violent or
dangerous felonies for all of them.' Defense counsel did not
object to this testimony or to the introduction of copies of the
commitment records and the summaries of sentence data.
The evidence of these prior convictions was admissible to
prove that each was serving a life term at the time of the
assault on Smith. [8] When a prior conviction is an essential element of an offense, it is admitted to prove something
other than the defendant's bad character, and is admissible
for that purpose. II (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b); People v.
DoraWo (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 338, 358 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d
361] ; People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, 338 [202 P.2d
53).)
[7b] Nevertheless, we feel that the prejudicial effect of
this cumulative testimony outweighed the legitimate purposes
served by its admission. The impact of this testimony cannot
be overstated: at the outset of the trial, the jury was presented with the picture of four hardened, vicious convicts
charged with another offense in a long line of similar violent
'Chacon had been eonvicted of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187),
second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), possession of a weapon by an
inmate (Pen. Code, § 4502), and battel'y by an inmate on a non·inmate
(Pen. Code, § 4501.5). Noah's eonvictions were for aggravated assault
by a nonlife termer (Pen. Code, § 4501), attempted escape by force or
violence from the county jail (Pen. Code, § 4532), and assault with a
deadly weapon on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245). Meyers had been
convicted of aggravated assault by a nonlife termer (Pen. Code, § 4501).
Garcia had been convicted of possession of a deadly weapon by an inmate
(Pen. Code, § 4502).
liThe evidence concerning Chacon's conviction for battery on a nouinmate (Pen. Code, § 4501.5) could not have been admitted for this purpose siuce it does not carry a maximum life sentence. Since the conviction
was for a recent similar offense, bowever, it was admissible to prove
malice and to negate Cbacon's defense of non-involvement exeept as a
peacemaker. (People v. Wells, supra, 33 Ca1.2d 330, 339-343; McCormick,
Evidence, § 157, pp. 329-330 (1954); Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2,) ed. ]966)
§ 345, and cases cited therein.) For this purpose, howe,'!',', it eould be
introduced as rebuttal, for it will only be nfter tIl(' defense has presented
its case that the defense contcntions will bc known.
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offenses. Even the most conscientious juror would be hard
pressed to concentrate solely on the facts of the crime charged
in the indictment. Both defense counsel were willing to stipulate that the four defendants were serving life terms. The
)
f
prosecuting attorney, however, would agree to such a stipula. tion only if the commitment records were admitted for his use
in argument. He thus indicated both full awareness of the
prejudicial effect of this testimony and a wish to make full
advantage of it. Thc prosecution could have established the
fact that the defendants are life termers in a less prejudicial
way than that undertaken here.
[9] Both Chacon and Noah contend that the jury was
prejudiced in that each defendant appeared throughout the
trial handcuffed and in prison garb. It appears that all J'
defendants were similarly treated for at least some parts of
the trial. No leg chains were used, and there is no evidence of \'
excessive use of guards in the courtroom. There was no objection to the handcuffs or the clothing. On several occasions
during the voir dit·c, the trial judge, prosecuting attorney, \
and defense attorney mentioned the handcuffs and inquired
whether the jury would be affected by them in making their
decision. All responses were negative. In his argument to the
jury on the issue of guilt, the prosecutor emphasized that the
jury should not be prejudiced against defendants because
they were in handcuffs; defense eounsel admonished the jury
to the same effect and did not request the court to give a simi- I'
lar admonition.
[10] A defendant may be required to undergo reasonable'
restraints when they are necessary to assure his detention or
to maintain order in the courtroom. (People v. Kimball
(1936)5 Cal.2d 608, 611 [55 P.2d 483] ; People v. Burnett
(1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 651, 655 [59 Cal.Rptr. 652].) The
restraints in this case were reasonable. Apparently counsel
did not think them improper, for he did not object to them.
In a case such as this one the use of handcuffs was not unreasonable. (Peoplc v. Ross (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 64, 71-72 [60 Cal.
Hptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606], revd. 011 other grounds 391 U.S. 470
[20 L.Ed.2d 750, 88 S.Ct. 1850] ; Pcople v. Burwell (1955) 44
Cal.2d 16, 33 [279 P.2d 744] ; People v. Chcssman (1951) 38
Ca1.2d 166,176 [238 P.2d 1001].) Nor do we find any error in
the use of prison garb. The defendants did not object to being
tried ill -prison clothing and show no prejudice arising from
it. (Cf. People v. Zapata (1963) 220 Ca1.App.2d 903, 911 r34
Cal.Hptr. ]7]] ; Peoplc v. Garcia (]954) ]24 Cal.App.2u 822,
824 [269 P.2d 673J.)
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[11] Dcfendants complain that the use of Smith and two
correctional officers, DeBord and Weber, as prosecut.ion witneSSl'S was part of an invidious scheme to discredit dcfense
witnesses.
The victim, Smith, testified for the prosecution. He stated
that he had started the fight; that defendant Chacon had not
been iuvolved j that he llad spoken with Officer DeBord shortly
after the incitlent but had not implicated defendants and had
not said that he would refuse to testify for the state out of
fear; and t.hat he did not presently fear tile defendants.
Officer DeBord, correctional counselor at San Quent.in, tlH'n
testified to a convprsation with Smith approximately one
mont.h after the incident. Over the objection of Garcia's counsel that the conversation was hearsay and impeaclllnent without foundation, DeBord testined that Smith said nothing
about his starting the fight, that he said all four defendants
had stabbed him, that he would not testify for the state
because he did not wish to be considered an informer, and
that he would testify for the defendants.
Officer Weber, correctional officer at Soledad, then testified
regarding the "convicts' code," which he said he had seen in
operation in many prisons. The "convicts' code" was
described as an unwritten rule that prison inmates be silent
about prison disciplinary matters. He testified that he had
often seen prisoners refuse to make any statement implicating
fellow inmates beeause of fear of reprisal.
This evidence was admissible. The prosecution's use of
Smith as a witness was not calculated merely to open the door
to impeachment of defense witnesses or the exculpatory testimony of Smith himself. Smith was the victim of the assault
and was thus a necessary witness in the prosecution's case.
He testified that he was attacked but went on to exculpate
defendants and to affirm their defense. His tcstimony was evasive and uncooperative. In such a situation, impeachment of
one's own witness is entirely proper. (Evid. Code, § 785;
People v. Johnson (1968) 68 Cal.2d 646, 650-651 [68 Cal.
Rptr. 599,441 P.2d 111] ; People v. Stanley (1967) 67 Ca1.2d
812,816, fn. 1 [63 Cal.Rptr. 825,433 P.2d 913].) [12] One
of the purposes of section 785 of the Evidence Code is to allow
a· party to use and impeach a hostile witness that he had
called. (Comment of the Law Revision Commission to Evid.
Code, § 785; Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating
to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 6 Cal. Law Revision Com.
Rep. (1964), comment to rule 20.)
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[13] Dt'Bol"d testified t]lat in his previous statem('nt,
Smith had describpd the ev('nt differently and indicated fear
of the defendants. The usc of a prior inconsistent statement to
impeach was proper. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (h); McCormick, Evidence, § 34.) DeBord's testimony as to Smith's fear
of defendants was also admissible to show bias of the witness
in favor of defendants. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f) ; McCormick, Evidence, § 40; People v. Sweeney (1960) 55 Ca1.2d 27,
39-44 [9 Cal.Rptr. 793, 357 P.2d 1049].)
[14] 'Veber testified to conditions generally existing in
prisons and their effect on the veracity of prisoners. His testimony was relevant (People v. De La Roi (1943) 23 Ca1.2d
692,696 [146 P.2d 225,151 P.2d 837]), and was admissible to
show circumstances affecting the bias of the witness. (Evid.
Code, § 780, subd. (f); People v. Pickens (1923) 61 Cal.App.
405, 407, 409 [214 P. 1027]; People v. Krug (1935) 10
Cal,.App.2d 172; 176 [51 P.2d 445].) The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that Weber was qualified as an
t\xpCl't. (Evid. Coue, § 720; People v. Clay (1964) 227 Cal.
App.2d 87, 98 [38 Cal.Uptr. 431, 100 A.L.R.2d 1421].)
']'he cases cited by ueft-lluunts are not in point. Weber did
not give his opinion of the guilt or innocence of the defendants (People v. jJla.~un (19GO) 183 Cal.App.2d 168, 173 [6
Cal.Rptr. 649]), of Smith's intellt (People v. Davis (1941) 47
Cal.App.2d 331, 334 [117 P.2d 917]; cf. People v. Cohen
(1941) 48 CaI.App.2d 459, 464 [119 P.2d 995]), or of the
meaning of a statute. (People v. /(usc (1890) 85 Cal. 378, 382
[24 P. 817].) Nor did Webl'l' testify to any similar acts by
Smith (People v. Nelson (1928) 90 Ca1.App. 27, 34 [265 P.
366]; People v. Stewart (1890) 85 CuI. 174,175 [24 P. 722].)
Weber testified, not that Smith was lying, but that the conditions under which he lived might compel him to lie.
[15] Although the point was not raised in the briefs, our
examination of the record has convinced us that the instructions on malice aforethought were inadequate. 1I [16] Penal
liThe trial judge gave the following instructions: "An essential element of the offense stated in Section 4500 of the Penal Code is that the
assault bc conlmitted with malice lIfOI·ctholight. As used in Section 4500,
that term denotcs 'purpose and deHign in contradistinction to accident
and mischance ..• it is used to denote the purpose and design of the
assaulting party.' In order to establish guilt under 4500 Penal Code, it
is not required that the assault be lIla<le with intent to kill." This does
not adequately describe the state of mind constituting malice aforethought, and we disapprove its URC. ,]'h ... tl'ial courts should follow the
definitions developed under ~ections 187 and 1~!8 in instructing on malice
aforethought.
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Code section 4500 expressly requires that an assault punishable tllerein must be "with malice aforetllOugllt." The words
malice aforE'thought in section 4500 have the same meaning as
in sections 187 and 188. (People v. McNabb (1935) 3 Ca1.2d
44], 456 [45 P.2d 334J ; People v. Wells (1949) 33 Ca1.2d 330,
338 [202 P.2d 53J ; see People v. Berry (1955) 44 Ca1.2d 426,
430 r282 P .2d 861].) Thus the rules that have evolved regarding malice aforethought as an element in a cllarge of murder
apply to section 4500.
[17] In the instant case, defendants requested an instruction on thp issue of provocation. This request was denied,
although the judge did instruct on the issue of self-defense.
The rrfusal to give the requested instruction was erroneous.
In a prosf'cution for murder the presence of sufficient provocation or hl'at of passion negates the existence of the requisitl'
malice aforethought. (People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Ca1.2d
121, 132 [169 P.2d 1].) In tJle usual case, this instruction
supplplnf'nts th~ self-defense instruction. Thus, in a prospcution for murder, even though the defense of self-defense fails,
8JI it might for etxcessive retaliation by the defendant, the jury
might still flnd the original attack sufficipnt to constitute provocation, which would preclude a finding of malice aforethought
and reduce the crime to manslaughter. Since the refusal to
instruct on provocation would be erronpous in a prosecution
for Ulurdt'r, it was erroneous here.
1\. closely analogous situation involves the defense of diminisJled capaeity. This defense, now established in murder prospcutions (People v. McDowell (1968) ante, p. 737 [73 Cal.Rptr.
1, 447 P.2d 97]), was originally applied in a prosecution
tion undE'1' seetion 4500. (People v. Wells (1949) 33 Ca1.2d
330, 343-346 [202 P.2d 53].) The analogy is particularly apt
in that a finding of diminished capacity, like a finding of
proyoeation. clln also negate the existence of malice afoTf'thought. (People \'. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 3] 8 [49
Cal.Rptr. id5, 411 P.2d 911J.)
The judgments are reversed.
MeComb, J., Peters, .J .. Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Rullh'an, .J., concurred.
RespondE'nt's petition for a rehearing was denied December 24, 1968, and the opiuion was modified to read as printed
above.
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